Analysis: Could Putin’s Ukraine failures trigger a new Russian revolution?

At the start of the twentieth century, imperial Russia projected size and strength to the outside world. Internally, however, the foundations of Tsar Nicholas II’s rule were already under strain.

Social tension, political stagnation, and economic hardship created a volatile backdrop for decisions that would soon reshape the empire’s fate.

As pressures mounted and reform stalled, the imperial court searched for ways to reassert authority. A foreign conflict appeared to offer a solution, but it would instead expose the fragility of autocratic rule.

Mounting pressures

Russia entered the new century facing deep internal challenges. Rapid industrial growth had drawn workers into overcrowded cities, where long hours, low wages, and unsafe conditions bred resentment. In rural areas, peasants struggled with debt and land shortages that left many on the brink of survival.

Politically, Russia remained an outlier among major European powers before 1905. It lacked a constitution and national representative institutions, and opposition movements spread through universities, newspapers, and underground networks. Nicholas II resisted reform, convinced that any concession threatened his divinely sanctioned authority.

Turning to war

As unrest grew, the regime turned outward. War was seen as a way to restore pride, unite society, and distract from domestic problems. In 1904, Russia entered a conflict with Japan, expecting a quick victory against what many officials wrongly regarded as an inferior power.

Those assumptions proved disastrous. Japan’s level of preparation and military effectiveness shocked Russian commanders, revealing weaknesses that years of neglect, corruption, and bureaucratic inertia had left unaddressed.

Military humiliation

The Russo-Japanese War quickly turned against Russia. Major defeats, including the loss of Port Arthur and the destruction of the Baltic Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima, stunned the public. These defeats severely damaged Russia’s reputation as a great power and undermined confidence in the state.

The war also strained the economy. Military spending contributed to inflation, food shortages worsened, and many workers faced falling wages and unemployment. Strikes spread through industrial centers, while peasants resented conscription and sacrifice for a war that brought no tangible benefits.

Authority erodes

Discontent reached the armed forces themselves. Poor equipment, harsh discipline, and ineffective leadership weakened loyalty. Mutinies—most famously aboard the battleship Potemkin—signaled cracks in what had long been the regime’s most vital pillar.

Defeat abroad fed unrest at home. In January 1905, troops fired on peaceful demonstrators in what became known as Bloody Sunday, triggering nationwide strikes and uprisings. The war did not cause revolution on its own, but it transformed long-standing discontent into open revolt.

In seeking rescue through war, Nicholas II instead hastened the erosion of his authority, setting Russia on a path toward upheaval and, ultimately, the collapse of the Romanov dynasty.

Fast forward to today

There are, of course, significant differences between Russia in the early twentieth century and the Russia of today.

On paper, modern Russia is a democracy, and Vladimir Putin has repeatedly won elections. While many international observers dispute the fairness of these processes, elections may still give some Russians a sense—however limited—of political participation.

Both regimes relied on censorship, but the tools differ dramatically. Digital technologies have made it far easier for a modern state to monitor information flows, suppress dissent, and act rapidly against perceived threats.

Economically, today’s Russia is a mixed system combining state control, private enterprise, industry, services, and a large defense sector. Tsarist Russia, by contrast, remained overwhelmingly agricultural, making economic shocks and food shortages especially destabilizing.

The rigid legal class structure of the imperial era has also disappeared, replaced—at least formally—by greater individual freedom to move within society, even if informal power networks still matter greatly.

These are only some of the differences. Still, the similarities are what draw attention.

Parallels and pressures

Under the Tsar, political power was highly personalized. When things went wrong, responsibility ultimately rested with Nicholas II. Today, Vladimir Putin is the de facto center of political authority in Russia, despite the country’s democratic façade. As a result, accountability—real or perceived—also tends to flow upward toward him.

Economic hardship played a major role in fueling unrest under the Tsar, particularly rising food prices and declining living standards. In modern Russia, inflation remains a persistent concern. Official statistics show consumer price inflation running at roughly 6–7 percent year-on-year in late 2025, eroding purchasing power and making daily life more difficult for many households.

Power and decision-making were highly centralized under the Tsar, and a similar pattern characterizes today’s Russia, where key political, military, and economic choices are concentrated in the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, the Russian government continues to promote the narrative that victory in Ukraine is inevitable. Independent analysts and open-source reporting, however, frequently point to ongoing military difficulties, manpower strains, and material losses that complicate these claims.

So, is a new Russian revolution coming?

I could continue comparing Russia under the Tsar with modern-day Russia, but the real question is whether a military setback—particularly in Ukraine—could trigger a revolutionary collapse.

This is a subject of active debate among analysts, historians, and security experts. I do not claim to be one of them.

My conclusion, however, is that even a Russian defeat in Ukraine is unlikely to produce a revolution in the near future.

Here’s why.

• First, the Kremlin has shown a strong ability to reframe the goals of the war. At times the objective has been presented as the full subjugation of Ukraine; at others, as securing eastern territories or defending Russia against NATO. In a tightly controlled information environment, many citizens may struggle to keep track of these shifting claims.
• Second, what truly tipped the balance during the early twentieth century was the loss of loyalty within the armed forces. In 1905, soldiers and sailors increasingly refused orders or joined protests. In modern Russia, the Kremlin maintains close oversight of military leadership and internal security forces, making a comparable breakdown far less likely.
• Third, while Russian losses in the Russo-Japanese War are generally estimated at under 250,000 killed and wounded, estimates for the war in Ukraine are far higher. Some Western research institutions and analysts suggest that Russian killed and wounded may approach one million according to estimates from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, though exact figures remain contested. Ironically, these losses may reduce rather than increase the likelihood of an armed uprising, as casualties remove potential participants and discourage collective action.
• Finally, the modern Russian state has shown itself willing and able to suppress opposition forcefully. Human-rights organizations and international media have documented widespread arrests, harsh sentencing, and intimidation of critics. Allegations of targeted violence against opponents have also surfaced in investigative reporting, though such claims vary in credibility and are often difficult to verify conclusively. Regardless, the scale and speed of repression today far exceed what was possible under the Tsar, when slower communications allowed opposition movements more time to organize.

Conclusion

Even though some Western commentators speculate about regime collapse or revolutionary change in Russia, history suggests caution. Structural similarities with the past exist, but the mechanisms of control, surveillance, and repression in modern Russia are far more advanced.

For now, a replay of 1905—or 1917—appears unlikely.

Sources consulted: National Security Journal, Encyclopedia Britannica, Wikipedia, Institute for the Study of War, History.com, International Encyclopedia of the First World War, BBC

This article is made and published by Jens Asbjørn Bogen, who may have used AI in the preparation