Jens Asbjørn Bøgen
The batrayal-narrative stems from a chat back in 1990.
The batrayal narrative stems from a chat back in 1990.
Putin’s NATO grievance
Russian President Vladimir Putin does not miss any oppertunity to tell the Russian public about how dangerous NATO is, how the alliance is planning a war with, or even an invasion of Russia, and that the threat from NATO is one of the main reasons for the war in Ukraine.
Joint forces
It might be hard to believe, but Russia has actually worked with NATO in the past.
In fact, during the 1990’s, Russia and NATO even formed a joint implementation force for the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
But things took a turn for the worst in Putin’s second term as president.
Putin’s Munich speech
In a defining 2007 address to the Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin accused the West of betraying verbal commitments made in the 1990s.
He argued that these broken assurances had left international law in ruins and deeply damaged Russia’s trust in Western institutions.
But that begs the question: What commitments do Putin think NATO has betrayed? And does he have a point?
Yeltsin echoed the betrayal claim
The betrayal narrative isn’t just Putin’s. Boris Yeltsin, his predecessor, also voiced frustration as early as 1993.
From the mid-1990s onward, Russia’s political elite — across ideologies — adopted the view that NATO’s growth represented a breach of trust and a strategic threat.
Baker’s 1990 conversation with Gorbachev
At the heart of Russia’s claim is a conversation from February 9th 1990.
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand “one inch to the east” if Moscow accepted German unification.
Russia interpreted this as a clear commitment.
Helmut Kohl’s ambiguity on NATO’s future
The following day, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl reinforced that message, telling Gorbachev NATO would not extend into East Germany. His wording was vague but supportive.
This added to the perception that a firm agreement — if not a formal one — had been reached.
A speech that sealed the deal?
On 17 May 1990, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner gave a speech reinforcing the non-expansion idea.
It did not, however, announce a binding non-expansion pledge.
Nevertheless, Putin later cited this speech as further evidence that the West had made a promise it never intended to keep.
Not included in the final treaty
Despite these statements, no formal treaty included a NATO non-expansion clause.
Baker himself later admitted, he had “got a little forward on his skis.”
The final treaty only covered Germany and does not mention NATO membership prospects for any other countries.
What did the treaty say?
The treaty signed on 12 September 1990, known as the “Two Plus Four Agreement,” allowed foreign NATO troops into former East Germany with German consent.
But it didn’t address other Warsaw Pact nations.
Still, NATO’s Article 5 protections had, for the first time, moved eastward.
Immediate Russian unease
Russian policymakers warned Gorbachev that NATO could eventually spread beyond Germany.
Although verbal reassurances were allegedly made about NATO’s limits, no binding guarantees followed.
The Soviet Union saw this omission as a red flag — and a potential strategic failure.
A telling exchange
In March 1991, Soviet Defence Minister Dmitry Yazov allegedly asked British Prime Minister John Major whether Eastern European countries might join NATO.
Major reportedly replied, “nothing of that sort will ever happen.”
This remark, never codified, reinforced Russia’s belief in a broken promise.
Yeltsin’s 1993 letter to Clinton
In 1993, Boris Yeltsin directly challenged NATO’s intentions.
He wrote to U.S President Bill Clinton, arguing that any further expansion eastward would violate the spirit of the 1990 agreement.
Yeltsin was not demanding NATO stop entirely — but wanted Russia’s concerns respected.
The Clinton Administration’s response
The U.S. State Department took the complaint seriously. Officials even asked Germany to assess its merit.
The German foreign minister’s aide responded in 1993 that Russia’s complaint was legally baseless — but emotionally valid.
The optics, he noted, were problematic.
A new treaty meant to heal old wounds
In 1997, NATO and Russia (The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991) signed the Founding Act to build trust.
Yet even then, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov brought up Baker’s “double dealing” from six years earlier.
The ghost of 1990 lingered, even as both sides tried to start fresh.
Side comments vs. treaty text
The U.S. responded by investigating the “betrayal” narrative internally.
It found that while some European politicians had offered verbal assurances, no such commitments were part of any signed treaty.
Legally, the West was in the clear — but diplomatically, the damage had been done.
Moments of Russian consent
Despite public objections, Russia occasionally signaled acceptance.
In 1993, Yeltsin stunned colleagues by telling Polish leader Lech Wałęsa he accepted Poland’s right to join NATO.
This moment revealed a pragmatic side to Russia’s stance, even if it wasn’t shared widely at home.
A framework for dialogue
The NATO-Russia Founding Act didn’t stop NATO from expanding — but it did create a framework for dialogue.
Yet even this agreement couldn’t erase decades of mistrust over earlier events.
So do Russia have a point?
Even though som officials did make promises about not expanding NATO Eastward, a written agreement/treaty on the matter was never signed.
So legally, Putin is not correct when he claims that NATO has betrayed Russia – but legal is one thing, emotions are another, as we all know.
Will it ever change?
Trust takes time to build, but can be broken in a second. No matter if Russia is right or not about the the betrayal narrative, the West cannot ignore how Russia has experienced all of this.
Only time will show, if the West and Russia can ever reconcile.
This article is made and published by Jens Asbjørn Bogen, which may have used AI in the preparation
