August M
In the months before Russian troops entered Ukraine, Western intelligence agencies took the unusual step of exposing parts of their own findings.
An investigation by The Guardian, cited by Ziare.com, explains how the United States and Britain gathered detailed evidence of Moscow’s intentions – and why those warnings struggled to gain traction among allies and in Kyiv.
Declassified warnings
According to The Guardian, Washington made an unprecedented decision in late 2021 and early 2022 to share large volumes of classified intelligence with partners and even release selected findings publicly. The aim was to deter Moscow and prevent allies from being caught off guard.
The move reflected confidence within US and UK agencies that Russia was preparing for a major assault. The Guardian reports that satellite imagery showing large-scale troop deployments near Ukraine’s borders and intercepted communications played a central role in shaping that assessment.
Yet the strategy carried risks. Disclosing information meant potentially exposing sensitive “sources and methods,” a step rarely taken in real time.
Doubts and shadows
Even with detailed briefings, skepticism persisted. The Guardian notes that the legacy of flawed intelligence surrounding the 2003 Iraq invasion influenced several European governments, making them wary of worst-case scenarios presented by Washington.
Jake Sullivan, US President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, later described the administration’s frustration: “We felt the evidence presented was overwhelming. It wasn’t that we withheld anything that would have changed the situation. They were simply convinced that such a scenario didn’t make sense.”
The Guardian reports that some European officials questioned whether the Kremlin would truly risk a full-scale war, while others feared that strong public reactions could themselves escalate tensions.
Mission to Moscow
As part of the effort to avert conflict, CIA Director William Burns traveled to Moscow in November 2021 to deliver a warning directly to President Vladimir Putin. Unable to secure a face-to-face meeting, Burns spoke with him by phone.
Recalling his return to Washington, Burns said President Biden pressed him on whether an invasion was likely. “I said, ‘Yes,’” Burns remembered. Three and a half months later, Russian forces crossed the border.
According to The Guardian, US and British assessments at the time included concerns that the operation could extend to Kyiv and involve attempts to reshape Ukraine’s leadership. Those conclusions were not universally accepted across Europe.
Kyiv’s calculation
The Guardian reports that President Volodymyr Zelensky was cautious about amplifying Western warnings, concerned that public alarm could damage Ukraine’s economy and stability before any attack occurred.
A US official quoted by the newspaper said, “In recent weeks, intelligence leaders had begun to understand the gravity of the situation. The atmosphere was different. But the political leadership refused to accept until near the end.”
Four years later, debates continue over whether earlier preparations would have altered the opening phase of the war. The Guardian concludes that one enduring lesson is the need to consider even scenarios that appear improbable.
Sources: The Guardian, Ziare.com
