Kathrine Frich
Concerns over foreign espionage have intensified in the UK as authorities warn that digital networking platforms are increasingly being exploited for intelligence gathering.
Analysts say professional networking sites have become effective tools for identifying people with policy access who may not realise they are being targeted.
MI5’s latest public alert highlights how online approaches can appear harmless long before their true purpose becomes clear.
Recruitment tactics
According to reporting in The Times, MI5 revealed that Chinese intelligence officers have been contacting individuals in British politics through fake LinkedIn profiles.
Messages were sent in broken English by accounts using the names Amanda Qiu and Shirly Shen, both posing as “headhunters” linked to Chinese companies.
A security memo to MPs warned that the accounts were operated by China’s Ministry of State Security and used to “carry out large-scale information activities.”
Fake firms seeking experts
MI5 outlined a pattern in which Beijing’s services offer “large financial incentives for seemingly low-level information” as a way of cultivating future sources.
Targets include parliamentary staff, think tank researchers, economists, consultants and others positioned close to lawmakers.
Initial contact often involves requests for “geopolitical reports” for companies that may exist only on paper.
Establishing contact
The agency said officers “use fake identities on websites like LinkedIn,” seeking “non-public” insight and knowledge of political networks.
External headhunters based in China are used to make first contact before handing targets to intelligence officers posing as corporate clients.
MI5 said this begins with a small writing task that later develops into a working relationship.
Example approaches
James Price, a former special adviser to the Conservative Party, was contacted last year by someone claiming to represent a Chinese battery company.
“Hi, James, nice to meet you,” the message said, offering a part-time role as a “think tank expert.”
Price recalled: “I then received a long, boring message about a Chinese battery company… I either thought it was spam or something more malicious, and I didn’t respond.”
Searching for “insiders”
Qiu also posted adverts looking for political “insiders,” including people with government or academic experience.
One listing asked for reports on policy developments across several European countries.
Among those targeted was a staff member working for Conservative MP Neil O’Brien, who said online: “I can confirm that they tried to contact my staff.”
Luke de Pulford of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China said the method was a “very common modus operandi,” describing it as low cost and highly efficient.
A senior UK government source told The Times that MI5’s decision to publicise the names was also meant to signal to Beijing that “we know what you’re doing.”
