Jens Asbjørn Bøgen
It could have helped save the lives of countless Ukrainian civilians.
Military action targeting Iran’s weapons infrastructure is unfolding as part of a joint effort by the United States and Israel.
The campaign is aimed at weakening Tehran’s ability to launch missiles and drones.
But the strategy has also renewed debate over why Ukraine has not been given comparable tools to strike similar facilities inside Russia.
According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), US and Israeli forces are striking Iranian drone and missile production and storage sites in an effort to ease pressure on air defence systems used to intercept those weapons.
By reducing Iran’s offensive capacity, the strikes are intended to lower the number of missiles and drones that need to be intercepted.
Limits on Kyiv
ISW notes that Ukraine faces a different situation in its war with Russia. Kyiv has long requested US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles that could reach deep inside Russian territory.
That request was ultimately rejected by Washington in autumn 2025, leaving Ukrainian forces without a comparable long-range strike option.
Ukraine does conduct attacks deep inside Russia using long-range drones. However, ISW notes those drones carry relatively small payloads and are generally unable to destroy hardened targets or large industrial facilities.
Strategic targets
ISW have pointed to several Russian sites that could be vulnerable if Ukraine possessed weapons with larger warheads and longer range.
One example is the Shahed drone manufacturing complex in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan, about 1,100 kilometres from the Ukrainian border.
Another key facility is the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Udmurtia, roughly 1,300 kilometres away, which produces a range of ballistic missiles.
Previous attempts
Ukrainian forces have attempted to strike both locations. Long-range drones targeted the Alabuga complex during 2025.
In February 2026, Ukrainian forces also struck the Votkinsk plant using domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles.
Those attacks caused damage but did not destroy or shut down the facilities, according to available reporting.
The analysts from the ISW suggest that if Tomahawk missiles had been provided in 2025, Ukraine might have been able to inflict more serious damage on Russian missile and drone production sites.
uch strikes, they argue, could have reduced Russia’s large-scale missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure during the winter of 2025–2026.
Sources: Institute for the Study of War, open-source reporting
