Kathrine Frich
Espionage rarely begins with secrets.
It often starts with something small. A conversation. A favor. A paid task that seems harmless. A message that looks like freelance work.
Only later does the real purpose become clear.
Security experts say Russia has adapted recruitment tactics refined over centuries to the realities of smartphones, encrypted messaging apps and cryptocurrency.
Here are six key steps specialists say are commonly used.
1. Identifying future insiders early
Long term infiltration can begin years before any classified material is shared.
In the 1930s, Soviet intelligence targeted promising figures within Western academic and political circles who were likely to rise into positions of influence. Recruits were told to distance themselves from visible ideological ties and build careers inside state institutions.
Kim Philby remains one of the best known examples. He built a career in British intelligence while secretly working for Moscow.
According to security specialist Dr Michał Piekarski of the University of Wrocław, this long game strategy still exists today and such agents are the hardest to detect.
2. Building trust through gradual contact
Traditional recruitment usually starts without politics.
Initial meetings often focus on neutral topics. Over time, small favors are requested. Nothing dramatic. Nothing obviously illegal.
Dr Piekarski says the classic method involves personal contact lasting months or even years. This can be carried out by intelligence officers posing as diplomats or by intermediaries who are already active agents.
Only after loyalty and discretion are tested do the requests escalate.
Some recruits are approached abroad. Others are targeted during visits to Russia. In certain cases, individuals volunteer their services.
3. Moving recruitment online
Sanctions, diplomatic expulsions and tighter monitoring have narrowed traditional recruitment channels in Europe.
In response, Russian services increasingly rely on online methods.
Telegram has become one of the main platforms used to contact potential short term operatives.
Instead of developing long term ideological assets, this model focuses on individuals willing to complete specific tasks.
4. Offering simple paid assignments
Online recruitment often resembles gig work.
Tasks can include spraying graffiti, photographing infrastructure, placing objects in specific locations or transporting packages. Instructions are delivered through short text messages, disappearing files, images or location pins.
The overall objective is rarely explained.
According to Dr Piekarski, these assignments are simple but well paid and easy to verify. This allows recruiters to test reliability quickly.
Those who perform well may receive riskier tasks. Those who are careless are easily discarded.
5. Paying in cryptocurrency
Payment is usually made through cryptocurrency.
This lowers the psychological barrier for participation because transfers are fast and appear anonymous. At the same time, it complicates efforts by law enforcement to trace financial flows.
Dr Piekarski notes that cryptocurrency transactions can be tracked, but doing so requires time, technical expertise and significant resources.
Graduated payments increase with risk, binding individuals more closely to the network.
Experts warn that such systems may also allow covert financing of political actors while bypassing traditional financial oversight.
6. Keeping agents disposable
The Telegram agent model assumes each operative is replaceable.
Recruits are given limited knowledge about the broader operation. If arrested, they cannot expose the wider structure.
From the perspective of Russian services, this approach is inexpensive and politically convenient.
It enables sabotage and destabilization below the threshold of open war while maintaining plausible deniability.
Dr Piekarski also warns that recruitment patterns can be used to shape narratives. If individuals from one country carry out sabotage, blame can be redirected toward that country.
The volume of such incidents, especially those targeting infrastructure, can create fear and potentially influence political outcomes.
Sources: Wirtualna Polska;
