Kenneth Glad
Federal reviews are putting new pressure on the security planning behind a major campaign event. The findings describe missed warnings, staffing strain and communication failures before an attack that changed the agency’s leadership.
The July 13, 2024 shooting in Butler, Pennsylvania, became a public test for the U.S. Secret Service. It forced congressional scrutiny, internal discipline and new questions about how an armed attacker reached the roof of the American Glass Research International complex with a clear view of Donald Trump.
According to USA Today, Department of Homeland Security inspector general findings released July 2 said security teams failed at multiple points before the gunfire. Trump was struck in the ear. A rally attendee was killed, and law enforcement later shot the attacker, Thomas Crooks.
The Secret Service accepted the watchdog’s criticism and said reforms have strengthened its operations since 2024:
“The U.S. Secret Service today is a stronger and more capable agency than it was in 2024, thanks in part to significant institutional reforms and investments in technology, personnel, and protective operations.”
Drone surveillance went undetected
The watchdog found that Crooks flew a drone near the rally site before the event, but personnel did not detect it because equipment malfunctioned and the operator had not received enough training.
At a political rally, a drone can reveal more than crowd size. It can show stage placement, police movement, roof access and blind spots that may not be obvious from the ground.
A separate breakdown involved the movement of warnings. Officials had concerns involving a range finder, a long gun and Crooks’ movement onto the roof, but no shared communications room had been created with state and local law enforcement.
“The Secret Service’s overall lack of policy and processes coupled with limited intelligence sharing and poor collaboration and communication with protectee staff and state and local law enforcement set the conditions that led to missing opportunities to prevent and detect the attempted assassination,” the report said.
The perimeter risk was visible
The perimeter findings were especially serious because the vulnerable area had already been identified.
USA Today writes that Pennsylvania State Police shared a security plan showing a space outside the rally perimeter that would remain unsecured, but the Secret Service did not sufficiently address it.
Open-air political events depend on more than barriers around the audience. Security planning also has to account for nearby rooftops, parking areas, business complexes, tree lines and other places where someone outside the venue may still have a clear route to attack.
The inspector general also said the Secret Service recognized a line-of-sight risk from the American Glass Research International complex toward Trump’s position. Available resources were not used to block that view.
Overtime masked staffing shortages
A separate watchdog report examined workforce pressure inside the Secret Service. During fiscal years 2023 and 2024, the organization was understaffed by an average of 21.4 percent, according to the inspector general findings reported by USA Today.
To keep up with its protective duties, the Secret Service relied on overtime and help from other agencies. Personnel logged about 1.2 million overtime hours. Some worked consecutive shifts with limited rest, a pattern the report linked to burnout and departures.
The Secret Service said it has worked to improve retention, training and hiring. Applicants now take an average of 326 days to enter duty as special agents and 256 days as police officers.
“The Secret Service has also streamlined our hiring processes by reducing the old, bureaucratic process, allowing us to bring the best candidates on board quicker,” the agency said.
Reforms face a practical test
The Butler attack led to leadership changes and discipline inside the Secret Service. Around the first anniversary of the shooting, six employees were suspended without pay for periods ranging from 10 days to six weeks.
The organization has also adopted additional protective measures, including bullet-resistant glass for outdoor presidential events.
In its July 2025 one-year update, the Secret Service said 46 congressional recommendations followed the attack. It reported that 21 had been implemented, 16 were still in progress and nine were directed to Congress.
For future events, the question is whether those changes can work under pressure: Warnings reaching the right people, sightlines closed before crowds gather and enough rested personnel in place before a threat becomes a clear shot.
Sources: USA Today, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security inspector general.
